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Many registered nurses (RNs) in Norway work part-time, or in non-health jobs. The 
nurses’ trade organizations claim that a wage increase will increase the short-term 
labor supply in health care. This paper is an attempt to identify the effects of job-type 
specific wage increases through policy simulations on micro data. The individual’s 
labor supply decision can be considered as a choice from a set of discrete alternatives 
(job packages). These job packages are characterized by attributes such as hours of 
work, sector specific wages and other sector specific aspects of the jobs. The unique 
data set covers all RNs registered in Norway and their families. The spouses’ incomes 
and age of the children are vital when estimating the labor supply of this profession. 
For married females the results indicate job type specific wage elasticities for hours of 
work of 0.17 in hospitals and 0.39 in primary care. The total hours worked in health 
and non-health jobs are actually predicted to be slightly reduced, but the change is not 
significantly different from zero. Single females are somewhat more responsive to 
wage changes than married ones. 3 
1. Introduction 
The excess demand for nursing labor in the national health services persists in many 
developed countries in spite of systematic increases in the education capacity in order 
to meet the demand. Finlayson, et.al. (2002) reports a nursing shortage in the UK of 
10,000 to 22,000 depending on the way vacancies are calculated. In the US, the 
national supply of registered nurses was estimated at 1.89 million full-time 
equivalents in 2000 while the demand was estimated at 2 million, a shortage of 
110,000 or 6 percent, by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2002). 
In Norway, the Ministry of Labor and Government Administration estimated the 
number of vacancies at 3,300 full-time positions in 1998. The nurse shortage is a 
problem as it reduces the quality of the services provided. In a survey initiated by 
Nurseweek (2002), three-fourths responded that they in the past year, had witnessed a 
negative impact on the quality of patient care as a result of a greater number of 
patients per nurse and higher turnover among experienced RNs.  
 
Many registered nurses (RNs) work part-time, in non-health jobs or are temporarily 
out of the workforce. Nurses’ trade unions claim that a wage increase will increase 
not only recruitment into the nursing profession, but also the short-term labor supply 
of those already qualified. Higher wages are claimed to increase hours worked by 
personnel employed in the health sector, and attract nurses from non-health activities. 
When the tax schedule is nonlinear in income, estimation of labor supply parameters 
is difficult. This paper is an attempt to quantify these short-term effects through policy 
simulations in a discrete choice framework. I apply a structural labor supply model 
with nonlinear budget constraints. Structural methods, though controversial, are 
advantageous when the objective is to analyze the effects of a policy alternative that 
may change the budget sets in complicated ways.  
 
The nurses choose the job package that maximizes their utility given a nonlinear 
budget set that incorporates taxes. These job packages are characterized by attributes 
such as hours of work, sector specific wages and other sector specific aspects of the 
jobs. The three sectors or job-types are in public hospitals, public primary care 
services and other “non-health” or “non-patient” jobs in public administration, private 
business and NGOs. The model is a static neo-classical structural labor supply model 
inspired by approaches like Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and van Soest 
(1995).  
 
I will not analyze the impact of wage increases as an instrument to mobilize those not 
working. One argument for not including this group is the differences in personal 
characteristics compared to those working, as discussed in the data section. Another is 
the small number of people not working in 1995; only 0.9 percent of the workforce, 
when subtracting the group with disability benefits or other social benefits as their 
main income.  
 
As most registered nurses are women, the literature on female labor supply provides 
an important background to this discussion. Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) 
provide a comprehensive review of research indicating that women’s workforce 
participation is responsive to changes in the wage rate, unearned income, spouse’s 
wage and marital status, as well as having children, particularly of preschool age. The 
survey indicates that labor supply elasticities for females are positive, i.e. the positive 
substitution effect outweighs the negative income effect.  4 
 
In relation to the nursing profession itself, a survey by Link (1992) summarizes the 
literature and finds that wage levels, and having children, influence labor force 
participation, although the responsiveness to wage changes has declined considerably 
over time. The latter finding reflects the fact that most RNs are now working.  
 
In a recent review of the labor supply literature for nurses, Antonazzo et.al. (2003) 
confirms the increasing use of panel data models, limited dependent variable models, 
and treatment of sample selection issues. They find that results vary considerably 
depending on the methods used, particularly on the effect of wages. The impact of 
one’s own wage on labor force participation is not significant in most of the studies 
on North American data, whereas there are some studies with elasticities greater than 
one. The impact on hours worked is estimated with elasticities from –0.94 to +2.8, 
depending on sample, time period and gender. The impact of an increase in household 
non-labor income is estimated with elasticities that are slightly negative in relation to 
the participation rate, and insignificant or negative for hours worked.   
 
There are fewer British studies available. One example is Phillips (1995) which 
estimates labor market participation elasticities with respect to the wage rate, non-
labor income, and costs incurred through work, reported for qualified and unqualified 
nurses. Participation is found to be highly responsive to wage changes, and some 
discontinuity is found in the supply function. The econometric model traditionally 
applied to nurses has been a logit model for the participation, and a selection-
corrected hours-of-work regression.  
 
A newly published study on Norwegian data by Askildsen et al. (2003) applies, 
however, a matched panel data set to estimate wage elasticities ranging from –0.06 to 
0.46 depending on the setup of regression of hours against log wage. They find that 
individual and institutional features are statistically significant and important for 
working hours, and find their estimate of 0.21 most reliable. This paper has a different 
and larger sample of nurses, including those working in non-health jobs, and separates 
the analysis for single and married females as their behavioral response is expected to 
be different. Two important features of this study are firstly the inclusion of the 
spouse’s income and other non-work income like capital income, transfers and 
savings. Omitting the non-work income is of extra concern when focusing on the 
married nurses, as it might lead to an upward bias of the wage elasticities.  
 
In their agenda for research on nurses’ labor supply Antonazzo et.al. (2003) 
advertised the need for econometric models that can handle nonlinearity in the labor 
supply function. I argue that the application of a discrete choice model, as presented 
in my study, is a feasible way to address this problem. A weakness in many of the 
existing studies is the small sample size and/or the exclusion of nurses not practicing 
in the health sector. An advantage of the matched registered data used in this study is 
the inclusion of all qualified nurses. Another benefit is the possibility to match family 
characteristics that are important for the nurses’ labor supply, such as spouse’s 
income and children’s age.  
 
In a policy perspective I find that there are reasons to have moderate expectations of 
what wages can achieve as a tool to reduce the overall shortage of nurses. The 
predictions of this paper are that wage changes have a minor impact on hours worked 5 
by the personnel employed in the health sector. Wage rates probably have a minor 
impact on nurses’ working hours compared to non-pecuniary factors. Furthermore, 
there are obvious weaknesses in focusing solely on the supply side of the labor market 
for health personnel, and the term ‘nursing shortage’ is slightly misleading. A higher 
wage level may both reduce the employers’ demand for nursing hours, as well as 
affect the hours offered by the nurses.   
 
For married women I find job type specific wage elasticities of 0.166 for the hospital 
jobs. The increase in hours is due to attracting nurses from primary care and non-
health jobs, as the average amount of working hours in the hospital sector is reduced 
through the wage increase. The total hours produced by our sample of RNs in both 
health and non-health jobs, taking job changes into account, are predicted to be 
inelastic. The wage elasticity for the primary care jobs is predicted to be 0.390, 
attracting labor from hospitals and non-health jobs. A simultaneous wage increase for 
hospital and primary care personnel reduces the number of nurses preferring a non-
health job. A simulated wage increase for health-jobs by 10% reduces the predicted 
share of nurses preferring a non-health job from 16.8% to 16.1%. The predicted wage 
elasticities of hours worked in this simulation are -0.002 for hospital jobs and 0.153 
for primary care jobs. The elasticities are only significantly different from zero at a 
10% level.  
 
For single women the job specific wage elasticities are stronger, especially in the 
primary care sector. Part of this effect is probably due to the fact that there are 
relatively few single nurses in the primary care sector, as nurses often start their 
career with a hospital job.  
 
After a presentation of the data and the context in Section 2, the model is presented in 
Section 3. In Section 4 the results are elaborated and Section 5 includes some 
calculations of the changes in the job-specific costs and total labor costs of a wage 




According to Statistics Norway (2003) there were 77,819 registered nurses below 
retirement age in Norway in 2002, of whom 69,690 were employed. Those not 
employed were mainly on disability pensions, medical and vocational rehabilitation, 
early retirement or further education. Auxiliary nurses with a year of education after 
college are not included in these numbers. Norway is one of the countries with the 
highest density of nurses with 15.3 working nurses per 1,000 population in October 
2002. Over 90% of the nurses are women. 91.4% of the employed nurses were public 
employees. Registered nurses receive a minimum of three years of education at 
college level. Personnel in administrative positions have often completed a year of 
administrative training. Nurse specialist training also adds one or two years. 
 
The study presented here is, however, based on the 51,500 nurses below retirement 
age permanently living in Norway in 1995. The Norwegian health services are 
primarily run by national and local government authorities. 50% of the nurses in our 
sample work in public hospitals. Close to 26% work in primary health care run by the 
municipalities in nursing homes, home nursing or health clinics. Only 5% are 
employed by private health services working in a private medical clinic or in the 6 
pharmaceutical industry. Some 15% work in non-health areas like public 
administration or in the service sector. Some of these teach at colleges or lower levels, 
work in occupational health in the industry or in public health administration. 6% earn 
their main income from different types of transfers like disability benefits. About 1% 
earn less than the minimum income required to qualify for public pensions, and do not 
receive transfers beyond the same limit of NOK 40,000.  
 
Table 1. Registered nurses by job type in 1995 
Category  Share 
Hospitals  49.9% 
Public primary care  25.7% 
Private healthcare  5.1% 
Non-health   15.3% 
Non-work  
Do not earn sufficient to qualify for national insurance:  
1G≈NOK 40 000 >Labor income>Social benefits.  0.9% 
Disability pensions and social security benefits  6.1% 
 
 
The public health sector is responsible for most of the production of health care 
services and for their financing. Primary health care is the responsibility of 
municipalities, but a considerable share of general practitioners run private practices. 
Municipalities are also responsible for general public health services, home nursing 
and nursing homes. The demand side is dominated by a few large groups of buyers 
that may be considered monopsonists. For a general overview of the Norwegian 
health care system, see van den Noord et.al. (1998) and European Observatory on 
Health Care Systems (2000).  
 
One explanation for nursing shortages as reported in Hirsch and Schumacher (1995, 
1998), is that hospitals face an upward sloping labor supply curve which results in a 
lower wage and employment level for nurses than if the market was competitive. 
“Monopsony would help explain reported shortages, since hospitals will list vacancies 
and desire to hire additional workers at the monopsonistic wage, but would decrease 
their profitability were they to raise wages to attract more applicants.” There is a 
parallel in a public setting, where the health care institutions are equipped with a fixed 
budget and an increase in wages could reduce the staffing they can afford. The 
empirical evidence for monopsony power in nursing labor markets is, however, 
sparse.  
 
Askildsen et.al. (2003) claim that it is important to correct for shift work, as omitting 
such institutional features will bias the wage effect. “The reason is twofold. If shift 
hours are considered burdensome, a wage compensation is required (Moore and 
Viscusi, 1990). If this compensation is insufficient, lower labor supply is offered, and 
the estimated wage effect will be downwardly biased. It may also be the case that shift 
workers just consider it too demanding to work long hours, and respond less to wage 
changes than those working on ordinary daytime contracts.” This paper uses a 
matched data set covering all registered nurses working in Norway. A drawback of 
using the complete sample of RNs is the lack of information about whether the nurses 
work shifts or regular hours. This study might therefore underestimate the true wage 
effect for some groups.  7 
 
The data set is based on several of the administrative data registers delivered by 
Statistics Norway. Using the register of authorized health personnel as an identifier 
we can link information about demography, including children, income and 
employment relations. We also know the spouses’ income and employment. It is 
assumed that this years saving for next years vacation is equal to the amount saved 
last year. Appendix 1 provides details about variable construction, trimming 
procedure and summary statistics for key individual level variables by job category. 
  
Hourly wage is the applied earnings measure, and is calculated by dividing annual 
earnings by hours in a full-time position for those working full-time. These calculated 
wages are used when assigning predicted hourly wages for all nurses in all the three 
job alternatives in the model below. I exploit the richness of the register data in this 
procedure, including residency and observed experience from the past 20 years. I 
control for the selection effect by applying a Heckman two-step procedure, as there is 
reason to believe that there is a selection process driving the decision of where to 
work, or not work at all. See Appendix 2 for wages, and Appendix 3 for taxes.  
 
I considered it likely that the decision process is affected by gender and family status. 
I have chosen to focus the analysis on the two subsamples of married and single 
females, as women dominate the nursing profession. I run two separate analyses, as I 
expect married nurses to be less sensitive than single ones to changes in wages. Many 
individuals registered as single will be cohabitants, but when cohabitants have a child 
together they are registered as married. Table A3 confirms the differences in 
characteristics; single nurses are younger and many of them prefer to live in central 
areas. Almost 30% live in greater Oslo. Two-thirds of the single nurses work at 
hospitals compared to 50% of the married females. 61% of the single nurses work 
full-time compared to 35% of the married ones.  
 
In the following model the RNs choose between three job alternatives: Hospitals, 
public primary care and non-health jobs in the service sector and employment in 
public administration. These are the dominating categories of work covering almost 
95 percent of those working. As reported in Table A2 those working in the private 
health care sector have other individual characteristics, including a higher spouse’s 
income. Nurses not working and those with public transfers as their main source of 
income, are excluded from this analysis.  
  
In our sample of married females 50% work at the hospitals, 33% in primary care and 
17% with other non-health tasks. The working hours are not observable, but 
calculated by division of annual income by predicted hourly wage. The hours are then 
categorized into 9 groups as reported in the first column in Table 4. In the estimation 
of working hours each alternative is allocated the average amount of working hours in 
that category, implying that within each category hours offered are uniformly 
distributed. For those who actually work at hospitals we estimate the average weekly 
working hours to be 28.9, compared to 30 hours in the primary care jobs and 25.5 
hours in the non-health jobs. For reasons of comparisons with later predictions we can 
construct an imaginary ‘average nurse’ by multiplying the shares for each hour 
category with the mean hours in the categories, and then multiplying by the job-type 
shares. We then get the following distribution of weekly hours by job type: 14.6 
hospital hours, 9.9 primary care hours and 4.3 non-health hours.  8 
3. Model 
The model focuses on the supply side of the labor market and implicitly assumes that 
the nurses are employed in the jobs they prefer. This is of courses a strict assumption, 
but on the other hand it was not far from the actual situation in 1995 with plenty of 
job offers in all practice types. However, the model does take account for the fact that 
most jobs offered are full-time jobs and that hospital jobs are more available in central 
areas.  
 
The nurses choose between job packages, each being defined by a job or practice type 
i, specific choice of hours h, and a wage rate per hour w. The three alternative job 
types or practice types are hospitals, primary care and non-health. There are 
unobserved job characteristics associated with practice type i, that may affect 
preferences and hence choices. As an example we may think of specific skills 
involved in the job, patient mix or shift work.  
 
Because the analyst does not know the nurses’ preferences, I will assume a random 
utility model  
 
Ui=Vi+εi,            (1) 
  
where Ui is the utility when the nurse works hi hours in job type i, Vi is the 
deterministic element in the utility function and εi is a stochastic term with an iid 
extreme value distribution with an expected mean of 0 and a variance of 
22 /6 σπ . The 
random term εi also captures the unobserved job characteristics associated with 
practice type i. 
 
The utility for job number i is given by  
 
U(C,h,i) = V(C(h),h) + ε(C,h,i),          (2) 
 
where C is the disposable household income after tax per year, h is hours of work 
representing leisure time, and i the unobserved job characteristics.  
 
The budget constraint, for given job number i, is 
 
C=f(hw)+I; h=Hi ,  w=Wi,                                         (3) 
 
where Hi  is the job i specific hours of work, and Wi the pre-tax hourly wage for job i. 
The nurses have a choice between nine categories of hours per week. The categories 
are constructed so that they represent the common work contracts. The categories are 
represented by the mean in each category, h ={18, 21, 25, 28, 30, 33, 35.5, 37.5, 40} 
hours per week. I also exclude non-market opportunities (h=0), meaning that all 
nurses in the analysis have to participate in the workforce. This is not a strong 
limitation, as almost all nurses observed not to be participating in the workforce are 
categorized as unable to work and granted a disability benefit. 
 
Note that for the same job, wage rates may differ across nurses by personal 
characteristics like experience, residency and country background. In addition, for the 
same nurse, wage rates may differ across jobs. For all individuals a pre-tax hourly 9 
wage is estimated for each job applying a Heckman two-step selection correction 
procedure. See Appendix 2 for the estimation of wages.  
 
The f(.) function represents the net-of-tax labor income while I is the family income 
other than the nurse’s own earnings (capital income after tax, spouse’s income after 
tax, transfers). A non trivial assumption made is that the spouse’s hours of work are 
exogenous as there is reason to believe that the spouse’s choice of working hours will 
correlate, either negatively, e.g. if one of the parents must look after the children, or 
positively as they have preferences for spending their leisure together.  
 
In traditional labor supply offered wages are determined by human capital 
characteristics and hours offered are uniformly distributed. However, in real life 
wages may vary across job types for observationally identical workers, and jobs with 
a specific number of hours may be more available in the market than other jobs, e.g. 
“full-time” jobs. Thus, when the nurses make their choice with respect to labor 
supply, they choose between job-packages with different wage and hours profiles.  
 
I assume that the nurses make their choices by maximizing utility, given the job-
packages available in the market. As already mentioned, the analyst does not observe 
preferences neither does he observe all details of the job-packages available in the 
market. Let Bi(h,l) denote the set of feasible jobs with hours of work Hi equal to h, 
when the individual lives in a geographic location categorized by a centrality dummy 
l. Let ( , ) i gh l be the frequency of jobs in Bi(h,l), which is related to the institutional 
availability of full-time jobs and the geographical location, as hospital jobs are more 
available in central areas. The geographical location only influences the availability of 
hospital jobs. It follows from above that the utility function can be written as 
 




i ε ~ = ε(f(Hi Wi)+I, Hi, i).             (5) 
 
Since hours of work and consumption are given when the job is given, the agent's 
choice problem is a discrete one, namely to find the job that maximizes utility. Let 
(,) Phl denote the probability that the agent chooses a job with hours of work h, when 
he/she lives in an area with centrality l. This is the same as choosing a job (any job) 
within P(h,l). When the random error terms { i ε ~ } are ii extreme value distributed, the 
probability ( , ) Phl  can be expressed as 
 
(,) Phl= P(choosing any job within B(h,l))  
 




exp( ( ; , )) ( , )
,







                      (6) 
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where D is the set of feasible hours of work and 
 
(h;w,I) v(f(hw) I,h) V/ . ψ σ =+ =         (7) 
 
Due to the assumption of extreme value distributed utilities, it follows readily that the 
choice probabilities are multinominal logits. By setting  ( , ) i gh l=1 in (6) we get the 
standard multinominal logit. The interpretation of the “opportunity density extended 
version of the standard multinominal logit” given in (6), is that the attractiveness of a 
choice measured by exp( ) ψ  is weighted by a function saying how available this 
choice is in the market. The weight is determined by  
 
12 ( , ) exp( ) ii gh l k l ν ν =+                           (8) 
 
where  i k =1 if the main job is full-time (35.5 hours per week or more), and  i k =0 
otherwise. l=1 if the individual lives in a central area and the choice is the hospital job 
type, and l =0 otherwise. For more details about this methodology I refer to Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strøm (1999). 
 
In an extended version of the model I also include a component in the opportunity 
index that corrects for the fact that the nurses have an education where the dominating 
pool of available jobs are found with the health care providers. There is however a 
possible endogeniety problem with this formulation, and that is why both alternatives 
are reported in the next section. The modified  (.) g  function is then  
 
12 3 ( , , ) exp( ) ii i gh l m k l m ν νν =+ +                          (9) 
 
where  i m =1 if the job i is with a health care provider, and  i m =0 otherwise.  
 
The deterministic part of the preferences is represented by the following “Box-Cox” 
type utility function,  
 









− −− − −
=+                (10) 
where  
 
01 12 23 3 () X XXX β ββ β β =+ + +                        (11) 
 
The first element represents the stochastic utility from consumption and the second 
element the stochastic utility of leisure time. See Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) 
for an empirical analysis applying this specification. An advantage of this 
specification is that it is flexible enough to yield both negative (back-ward bending 
labor supply curve) and positive wage elasticities. 8,760 is the total number of annual 
hours, from which 8 hours per day are subtracted for sleep. α , λ , γ  and the  s β′  are 
unknown parameters. For the utility function to be quasi-concave, we require λ <1 
and γ <1. Note that if  0 λ →  and  0 γ → , the utility function converges to a log-linear 
function. The characteristics are: X1= age of the nurse, X2= number of children below 
six years of age, X3= 1 if the person is born in Norway, 0 otherwise. An alternative 11 
specification is to use a semi-parametric approach like van Soest (1995), where the 
deterministic part of the preferences is represented by a polynomial. This approach 
will normally increase the fit, but is less rooted in economic theory.  
 
The parameters (α, λ, γ, β0, β1, β2, 12 , ν ν ,( 3 ν )) are estimated in a maximum-likelihood 




The following analysis contains a discussion of the estimated parameters of the 
model, before the observed and predicted choices of working hours and job types are 
presented. For both married and single nurses, the procedures presented in Section 
4.1-4.2 are undertaken twice, with and without an opportunity index that corrects for 
the fact that the RNs have an education where the dominating pool of available jobs 
are found with the health care providers (Model A and B, respectively). The predicted 
choices from Model A, with less accurate predictions, are presented in Appendix 4, as 
a backdrop to the predictions from Model B discussed in the following two sections. 
In Section 4.3 an analysis of the total wage cost of a job specific wage increase is 
presented.  
 



























Model A: Appendix 4.1 

















Model A: Appendix 4.2 




4.1 Married females 
From Table 3 we observe that all parameters except 1 β  are sharply determined and 
that λ  and γ  are estimated to yield a quasi-concave utility function. The income term 
in the utility function (10) is estimated with a λ  of –2.8 and an α , the constant in the 
consumption term, of 0.7, meaning that the nurses prefer the job that pays best if 
otherwise similar. The γ  in the leisure component is estimated to –6.4. Like α , the 
constant  0 β in the leisure term is positive and significant, meaning that more hours of 
leisure increases the utility. Surprisingly  1 β  is not significantly different from zero, as 
one might expect that the nurses would prefer jobs with less working hours when they 
get older. On the other hand they are responsible for their children earlier in their 
career and many choose to work part-time. This is confirmed by the positive, yet 
small,  2 β  of 0.03, which I interpret as a higher preference for part-time jobs for 
mothers of children below six years of age, than for the average nurse. The parameters 
in the opportunity index are also significant with  1 ν of 0.8 and  2 ν  of 0.5. It is worth 
noting that the McFadden’s Rho is very low, especially for the married females. One 
interpretation is that wage and working hours are relatively less important than other 
factors not observed, such as shift work, patient load, travel distance from home etc. 12 
when choosing a job. It is a similar situation for Model B, which takes into account 
that the dominating pool of jobs for the registered nurses is with the health care 
providers. The parameter  3 ν  is positive and significantly different from zero. The 
signs of the other parameters are unchanged. Observe that McFadden’s Rho is slightly 
higher in the extended model (B), but still worrying low.  
 
Model performance 
The basic model (A) performs poorly in the predictions of job type choices, as it 
seems that the multinominal model distributes the predictions almost evenly: 38% 
hospital, 30% primary care and 32% non-health (Column 2 in Table 4). The predicted 
choices of hour categories are generally in line with the observed ones with half-time 
and full-time preferred. The extended model (B) has much sharper predictions with 
52% working at hospitals, 31% working in primary care and 17 % in non-health jobs 
(Column 3 in Table 4). The predicted distribution of weekly hours is 14.7 in hospitals, 
8.4 in primary care and 4.6 in non-health work. The predicted hourly pre-tax wages 
used in the analysis were on average NOK 159 in the hospital sector, NOK 148 in the 
primary care sector and NOK 187 in non-health.  
 
Out-of-sample predictions 
In order to evaluate the model’s prediction properties, I use the estimated parameters 
from 1995 and predict preferred working hours in 2000. I use the pre-tax hourly 
wages, the tax system and the personal characteristics applicable in 2000. This 
procedure is undertaken for all females in 2000 and for those who were married in 
1995 and 2000. I compare the predictions with the observed choices. Only the 
predictions of the extended model (B) are presented in Table 5.  
 
Looking at all observed married females, the mean price corrected pre-tax hourly 
wages increased by 26% in the hospital sector, 32% in the primary care sector and 
14% in non-health. (N=25,242 in 1995 and 25,363 in 2000). The average age was 
43.1 in 1995 and 44.3 in 2000. Part of the wage increase is due to the higher seniority 
of the 2000 sample, as seniority is an important determinant for the wage in the public 
sector.  
 
The higher wage increase in the public sector, especially at primary care level, makes 
it natural to expect a reallocation of hours to this sector. Before I compare the 
observed and predicted choices in 2000, it is important to emphasize that the public 
health services were significantly strengthened from 1995 to 2000. The capacity boost 
took place at both care levels. Major structural changes in the health care sector make 
the comparison over time complicated.  
 
There was a 14% increase from 1995 to 2000 in the number of employees at 
psychiatric and somatic institutions in the specialist health services. According to 
Statistics Norway (2001) the number of full-time nursing positions increased by 23% 
to 27,415 in 2000. The number of full-time positions for auxiliary nurses was reduced 
by 4% to 8,386 in 2000, continuing the trend that this personnel category is replaced 
by registered nurses in hospitals.  
 
The number of full-time positions for physicians was increased by 23% to 8,288 in 
2000. However, there was also a significant increase in the production capacity, partly 
fuelled by the transition to an activity based funding system. In the specialist services, 13 
the number of discharges increased by 11% to 760,893 in 2000. Outpatient-
consultations were increased by 13%. The number of full-time positions, for all 
professions, increased by 30% in the primary care sector to 89,670 in 2000, reducing 
the ratio of full-time positions per patients to 0.44.   
 
The first column in Table 5 presents the observed and predicted choices for all 
married females working in 1995 who were also observed in 2000. The next column 
shows the same group’s choices in 2000. 18,244 married females were observed both 
in 1995 and 2000. The average age was 41.3 years in 1995, and naturally 46.3 years in 
2000. The third column presents all the married females with complete data in 2000.   
 
The observed changes in the five-year period deserve a few comments. Looking at the 
sample observed in both 1995 and 2000, there is a striking increase in the number of 
nurses employed in the primary care sector. There are at least four factors causing this 
development. Firstly, the relative wage has increased in favor of the primary care 
sector. The sample observed in both years has a pre-tax hourly wage increase of 20% 
in the hospital sector, 26% in the primary care sector and 9% in the non-health jobs. 
Secondly, the nurses in the sample are five years older in 2000 and they are simply 
following the normal trend of switching to the primary care services with age. One 
reason is probably an interest in moving their family out of the cities. There are less 
hospital jobs available in the suburbs and rural areas. Thirdly, the significant 
structural changes in the public health sector have boosted the mobility of the 
workforce. And finally, there is also a possibility that some specialized institutions, 
still not hospitals, are categorized as hospitals in 1995 and primary care institutions in 
2000, exaggerating the changes. The average number of hours worked is stable, 
however, with a reallocation between the sectors as described above.  
 
The predictions respond to the wage changes as expected; an increased share is 
predicted to work in the primary care institutions, with reductions in the others. The 
average number of working hours is underpredicted, and as in 1995 it is the hours in 
the primary care sector that are incorrectly predicted by the model. A conclusion thus 
seems to be that the model predicts the correct directions of changes, but 
underpredicts the hours. However, it is not surprising that the predictions are biased 
when taking the huge structural changes into consideration.  
 
What happens if the wage increases in the health care jobs? 
A wage increase for hospital personnel might change the hours worked for those 
already working there, and attract nurses from non-health jobs. The introduction of a 
policy simulation, repeating the predictions above and keeping the parameters 
previously estimated, but now with a 10 percent wage increase in the hospital jobs, is 
a way to predict the net magnitude of these effects. The probability of choosing a 
hospital job increases from 52.4% to 53.5%, as presented in Table 6, and the predicted 
hospital working hours increase by 0.3 hours per week per nurse. With almost 48 
weeks of work per year this adds up to 175 extra full-time positions. The gain in 
hospital hours must be weighted against the simulated reduction in primary care jobs 
pf 133 full-time positions, and the reduction in non-health jobs totalling 75 positions.  
 
The impact on the total working hours produced by all nurses in the sample, in health 
and non-health jobs, is a small reduction of 0.1 hours per week per nurse, or 33 full-
time positions. The wage elasticity in the hospital sector is predicted to be 0.166. This 14 
pattern of changes in the probability of a job type being selected and hours worked 
repeats itself when undertaking similar policy simulations for the primary care jobs, 
for both health jobs and for non-health jobs as presented in Table 6.  
 
In wage bargaining the hospital and primary care sectors normally follow the same 
pattern. When increasing the wage in both public health sectors, the model predicts a 
wage elasticity of 0.153 in the primary care sector, and zero (-0.002) in the hospital 
sector. The model predicts an increased probability of choosing a job in both the 
hospital and the primary care sector, but predicts fewer hours worked in average by 
those employed.  
 
Finally two attempts are made to identify the income effect. First a lump-sum transfer 
of NOK 50.000 is introduced, an amount equivalent to about 27% percent of the 
average annual income. Somewhat surprisingly this slightly alters the predicted mix 
of job types, as fewer RNs are expected to work in hospitals and non-health jobs, 
matched by more people preferring home care and nursing homes. Adding up the 
working hours for all sectors, the model predicts a reduction in expected average 
hours of 1.6% or more than 300 full-time positions. The other attempt is to repeat the 
simulation with a 10% increase of the non-wage income. The income elasticity is 
found to be –0.063 for all hours, -0.138 for hospital hours and 0.075 for primary care 
hours. The elasticity for primary care hours is not significantly different from zero at a 
10% level. Generally, many of the elasticities reported in this section are only weakly 
significant. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the standard deviation 
reported in the prediction contains both the uncertainty of the prediction for each 
individual, and information about the distribution of the predictions across 
individuals. The significance level is reported in Table 6, where * represents the 10% 




Table 3 Estimation of parameters of the utility function and opportunity densities. Married females. 
Model A  Model B 
Estimate Std.error P-value Estimate Std.error P-value
   
  Utility function 
β0  Constant ’leisure element’  0.052 0.010 [.000] 0.371 0.039 [.000]






β2  Number of children below 6 





Exponent ‘leisure element’ 
-6.415 0.237 [.000] -4.050 0.134
[.000]






0.690 0.107 [.000] 2.007 0.109
[.000]
 Exponent  ‘consumption 
element’  -2.806 0.268 [.000] -1.508 0.128 [.000]
          





1 if living in a central area, 0 
otherwise 






1 if the job is full-time, 0 
otherwise 
0.533 0.034 [.000] 0.546 0.032 [.000]
 
 
1 if the job is with a health care 
provider, 0 otherwise        0.739 0.020 [.000]
              
Number of observations  25,242  25,242
Log likelihood  -80,642  -79,878.5
McFadden's Rho  0.03     0.04  











Table 4 Observed and predicted hours for married females 
       Model A  Model B 
Observed and predicted hours    Main model*  Extended model 
Married females    Observed  Predicted Predicted 
N=25242     shares   probability probability 
           
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
             
Job type choice            
Hospital   0.505  0.378 0.020 0.524 0.052
Primary care    0.328  0.304 0.014 0.308 0.037
Non-health     0.168     0.317 0.010 0.168 0.017
   1.000  1.000 1.000 
             
  
Share (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type 
Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type 
Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type 
Hospital   14.6 15.2 10.9 0.7 14.7 1.6
Primary care    9.9 14.7 8.3 0.5 8.4 1.0
Non-health     4.3 10.0 8.6 0.5 4.6 0.5
All   28.7 7.1 27.8 0.7 27.7 0.9
              
Categories of hours           
Hours Cat.1 (Mean=18h/w)  0.139  0.168 0.022 0.172 0.030
Hours Cat.2 (Mean=21h/w)  0.132  0.154 0.014 0.157 0.019
Hours Cat.3 (Mean=25h/w)  0.118  0.130 0.004 0.131 0.009
Hours Cat.4 (Mean=28h/w)  0.138  0.109 0.003 0.109 0.005
Hours Cat.5 (Mean=30h/w)  0.085  0.094 0.005 0.094 0.005
Hours Cat.6 (Mean=33h/w)  0.091  0.071 0.008 0.071 0.007
Hours Cat.7 (Mean=35.5h/w)  0.138  0.161 0.023 0.146 0.053
Hours Cat.8 (Mean=37.5h/w)  0.086  0.068 0.014 0.071 0.011
Hours Cat.9 (Mean=40h/w)  0.074     0.044 0.012 0.049 0.010
   1.000  1.000   1.000 
Standard deviation in italics. * See wage elasticities in Appendix 4. 17 
 
 
Table 5 Observed and predicted hours for married females 2000 (Model B only) 
     
 
1995 




(If observed in 1995) 
  
All married females in 2000 
 
    Observed  Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted 
Married  females    shares     probability  shares    probability  shares    probability 
                        
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Sector choice                        
Hospital   0.518  0.500 0.523 0.052 0.441 0.497 0.508 0.051 0.432 0.495 0.508 0.051
Primary care    0.324  0.468 0.309 0.037 0.434 0.496 0.330 0.035 0.452 0.498 0.329 0.035
Other     0.157  0.364 0.168 0.017 0.125 0.330 0.163 0.016 0.116 0.320 0.163 0.017
   1.000   1.000  1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 
                        
  
Share (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Share (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Share (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Hospital   15.1  15.3 14.7 1.6 13.0 15.2 13.9 1.4 12.5 15.0 14.0 1.4
Primary care    9.9  14.7 8.4 1.0 12.5 14.8 8.9 1.0 12.8 14.8 8.9 1.0
Other     4.1  9.9 4.6 0.5 3.7 10.1 4.4 0.5 3.3 9.5 4.4 0.5
All   29.1  6.9 27.7 0.9 29.1 6.6 27.3 0.6 28.7 6.6 27.3 0.7
                          
Categories of hours                          
Hours Cat.1 (Mean=18h/w)    0.113  0.317 0.172 0.028 0.104 0.305 0.184 0.021 0.117 0.322 0.185 0.023
Hours Cat.2 (Mean=21h/w)    0.130  0.337 0.157 0.018 0.116 0.321 0.165 0.013 0.121 0.327 0.165 0.014
Hours Cat.3 (Mean=25h/w)    0.121  0.326 0.131 0.008 0.136 0.342 0.135 0.005 0.138 0.345 0.135 0.005
Hours Cat.4 (Mean=28h/w)    0.143  0.350 0.109 0.005 0.136 0.343 0.112 0.002 0.140 0.347 0.111 0.003
Hours Cat.5 (Mean=30h/w)    0.089  0.285 0.094 0.005 0.107 0.308 0.095 0.003 0.108 0.310 0.095 0.003
Hours Cat.6 (Mean=33h/w)    0.096  0.295 0.071 0.007 0.125 0.331 0.072 0.004 0.119 0.324 0.072 0.005
Hours Cat.7 (Mean=35.5h/w)  0.143  0.351 0.145 0.050 0.140 0.347 0.115 0.030 0.131 0.337 0.116 0.031
Hours Cat.8 (Mean=37.5h/w)  0.089  0.285 0.072 0.012 0.070 0.254 0.072 0.007 0.064 0.245 0.071 0.008
Hours Cat.9 (Mean=40h/w)     0.074  0.262 0.049 0.010 0.067 0.250 0.049 0.006 0.061 0.239 0.049 0.007
   1.000    1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000  1.000 
                
Age     41.3  7.5    46.3 7.5    44.3 8.5  
Sample size    18,244       18,244     25,363   
             18 
 
 
Table 6 Predictions of a policy experiment for married females 
           Predictions with   Predictions with  Predictions with   Predictions with     Predictions with   Predictions with  Predictions with  
Predicted    10% increase in  10% increase in  10% increase in  10% increase in   10% increase in  10% increase in  NOK 50,000 added to
          hospital wages    prim. care wages   both wages   non-health wages    all wages   
non-work 
income   non-work  income 
                                
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.   Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Prob (Job type choice)                                    
Hospital  0.524 0.052   0.535 0.053 0.515 0.050 0.526 0.052 0.520 0.051  0.522 0.051 0.521 0.052 0.516 0.050
Primary care  0.308 0.037   0.301 0.038 0.320 0.035 0.313 0.036 0.305 0.037  0.310 0.036 0.312 0.037 0.318 0.035
Non-health   0.168 0.017     0.164 0.017 0.165 0.016  0.161 0.016  0.175 0.019   0.168 0.017  0.167 0.017 0.166 0.017
  1.000   1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000   1.000  1.000  1.000 
                                    
Pr (Job type) * Mean hours in job type                                
Hospital  14.7 1.6   15.0 1.7 14.5 1.5 14.7 1.6 14.6 1.6  14.6 1.5 14.5 1.6 14.2 1.3
Primary care  8.4 1.0   8.2 1.0 8.7 1.0 8.5 1.0 8.3 1.0  8.4 1.0 8.5 1.0 8.6 1.0
Non-health   4.6 0.5     4.5 0.5 4.5 0.5 4.4 0.5  4.8 0.6   4.6 0.5  4.5 0.5 4.5 0.5
Total  27.7 0.9   27.6 0.9 27.7 0.9 27.6 0.9 27.7 0.9  27.6 0.9 27.5 0.9 27.3 0.6
                                    
Wage elasticities  (New pred. hours-Old pred. hours)/Old pred. hours*10                 
All hours       -0.016 0.014 -0.007 0.008 -0.022 0.02 -0.004 0.006  -0.026 0.025 -0.063** 0.020
Hospital hours       0.166** 0.059 -0.169** 0.085 -0.002 0.043 -0.090* 0.052  -0.087 0.084 -0.138** 0.058
Primary care hours       -0.230** 0.117 0.39 0.283 0.153 0.17 -0.090* 0.052  0.065 0.126 0.075 0.047
Non-health hours             -0.230** 0.117 -0.169** 0.085  -0.390** 0.186  0.431* 0.244   0.024 0.067  -0.076** 0.037    
Standard deviation in italics. * Significantly different from zero at a 10% level.  ** Significantly different from zero at a 5% level.   19 
 
4.2 Are single females more responsive to wage? 
It seems reasonable to expect that single females are more flexible in their choices and 
more able to choose jobs with higher working hours and overtime work. On the other 
hand most of them already work full-time, so the potential for increased hours of work 
is less than for married females. The average number of observed hours prior to 
categorization is 1,541 for the single females, compared to 1,353 for married ones. 
The non-work income is naturally much lower for the single females at NOK 43,567, 
compared to NOK 229,537 for the married ones. The average age is 35 years, 8 years 
younger than the married females.     
 
A complicating factor is the choices of the single mothers who are likely to be highly 
restricted by their parenting obligations and depending on childcare, which often is 
difficult to combine with shift work. This group, however, is small. The sample of 
single nurses also includes cohabitants without joint children.  
 
Most of the single nurses are young and work in central areas, often at hospitals. As 
they get older many of the single nurses too move to less central areas and work in the 
primary care sector. However, they do not reduce their hours of work like the married 
ones do in their late twenties and thirties, except for the single mothers. There is a 
selection out of the single status by age. It is thus somewhat problematic that my out-
of-sample prediction is based on those observed as single in both 1995 and 2000. The 
average nurse marries during the first five years after graduation.  
 
The parameters estimated for the single females follow a similar pattern to those of 
the married ones. The estimates are reported in Table 6. For the single nurses, the 
extension of the opportunity index (Model B) has a somewhat different effect on the 
parameter changes in the leisure component in the utility function, when comparing to 
the married nurses. Both 0 β and γ are reduced with this extension. As seen in Table 8, 
the extension of the opportunity index improves the accuracy of the predicted sector 
choices. A higher share of the single nurses prefer hospital jobs and full-time jobs. 
The predicted shares, with the observed in parenthesis, are 68.0% (65.8%) for 
hospitals, 21.2% (21.9%) for primary care and 10.8% (12.3%) for non-health. The 
single nurses work more hours than the married ones, 32.1 hours per week predicted, 
32.3 hours per week observed.  
 
Looking at the whole sample available in 1995 and 2000, hospital wages increased on 
average by 9%, the primary care wages by 14% and the non-health wages by 3%. The 
pre-tax hourly wages were on average NOK 154 at hospitals, NOK 146 in primary 
care and NOK 184 in non-health jobs. Limiting the sample to those observed in both 
years, the seniority effect is more important. The hospital wages increased by 23% 
during the five-year period, while wages in primary care and non-health jobs 
increased by 28% and 11% respectively. 
 
The observed changes from 1995 to 2000 indicate almost a doubling of the share 
working in primary care to 0.390 as found in Table 9. The shares of both hospitals and 
non-health jobs are reduced. The average number of working hours, is reduced by 
5.5%, mainly due to the reduced share at hospitals. Looking at the whole sample of 
11,091 single nurses in 2000 confirms this significant change in the share preferring a 20 
primary care job. But the reduction in hours is smaller when looking at the whole 
sample.  
 
The out-of-sample predictions presented in Table 9 are subject to the same 
complications due to structural changes in the health care sector as discussed for the 
married females. The predictions respond to the relative wage changes in the right 
direction, but underpredict the strength of the effects.  
 
Wage elasticities 
The wage elasticities are higher for the single nurses as presented in Table 10. The job 
specific wage elasticity for nurses working in hospitals is 0.196, while the elasticity 
for primary care jobs is 1.743. Part of this effect is probably due to the fact that there 
are relatively few single nurses in the primary care sector compared to married ones, 
as nurses often start their career with a hospital job. This predicted elasticity should 
thus be interpreted with care. When simulating an increase in both health jobs, the 
probability for choosing a non-health job is reduced to 0.094 from the previous 0.108. 
The predicted wage elasticity is found to be -0.235 for hospital jobs and 0.724 for 
primary care jobs. The predicted elasticity in the primary care sector is only 
significantly different from zero at a 10% significance level. The income elasticities 
are not significantly different from zero. The non-wage income of single nurses is 
quite low compared to the married ones. It may thus be unrealistic to expect that a 
10% increase in this component will have any identifiable effect. 
 
To conclude we find that the single nurses seem to be more responsive to wage 
changes than the married ones. The predicted effect is small however, and some of the 
elasticities are only significantly different from zero at a 10% level. Generally the 
effect of a job-specific wage rise is an increase in the number of people and the total 
hours worked in that job type, but with a corresponding reduction in hours in other job 
types. It also seems to be the case that those already working in the job where the 
wage is increased, reduce their expected average working hours slightly.  21 
 
Table 7. Estimation of parameters of the utility function and opportunity densities. Single females.  
    Model A  Model B 
EstimateStd.error
P-valueEstimateStd.errorP-value
      
  Utility function 
β0  Constant ’leisure element’  1.470 0.309 [.000] 0.894 0.179 [.000]





Exponent ‘leisure element’ 
-1.424 0.431 [.001] -2.741 0.358 [.000]




Constant ‘consumption element’ 
0.283 0.051 [.000] 0.832 0.096 [.000]
  Exponent ‘consumption element’ 
-3.592 0.214 [.000] -2.502 0.146 [.000]
      





1 if living in a central area,  
0 otherwise 





1 if the job is full-time,  
0 otherwise 
0.487 0.053 [.000] 0.538 0.056 [.000]
 
 
1 if the job is with a health care provider, 
0 otherwise      1.137 0.043 [.000]
         
Number of observations  7,782 7,782   
Log likelihood  -22,762 -22,342.6  
McFadden's Rho  0.11  0.13  










Table 8 Observed and predicted hours for single females 
Observed and predicted hours    Main model  Extended model 
Single females   Observed    Predicted  Predicted   
N=7782    shares      probability    probability    
           
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Job type choice              
Hospital   0.658 0.474 0.579 0.114 0.680 0.071
Primary care    0.219 0.413 0.182 0.056 0.212 0.061
Non-health     0.123 0.329 0.239 0.062 0.108 0.018
   1.000 1.000 1.000 
             
  
Share(Job type) * Mean hours 
in job type 
Pr (Job type) * Mean hours 
in job type 
Pr (Job type) * Mean hours 
in job type 
Hospital   21.8 16.4 19.1 3.8 22.1 3.2
Primary care    7.2 13.9 6.0 1.7 6.7 1.5
Non-health     3.3 9.2 7.7 2.0 3.3 0.6
              
  
Sum over [Share(Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type] 
Sum over [Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type] 
Sum over [Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type] 
All   32.3 6.4 32.7 1.6 32.1 2.3
                        
       
Categories of hours           
Hours Cat.1 (Mean=18h/w)    0.064 0.245 0.039 0.042 0.049 0.064
Hours Cat.2 (Mean=21h/w)    0.057 0.233 0.056 0.034 0.062 0.050
Hours Cat.3 (Mean=25h/w)    0.067 0.250 0.082 0.018 0.082 0.028
Hours Cat.4 (Mean=28h/w)    0.092 0.289 0.096 0.008 0.092 0.014
Hours Cat.5 (Mean=30h/w)    0.082 0.274 0.103 0.008 0.094 0.010
Hours Cat.6 (Mean=33h/w)    0.121 0.326 0.108 0.012 0.089 0.012
Hours Cat.7 (Mean=35.5h/w)    0.225 0.418 0.176 0.062 0.316 0.111
Hours Cat.8 (Mean=37.5h/w)    0.159 0.366 0.173 0.028 0.120 0.025
Hours Cat.9 (Mean=40h/w)     0.132 0.339 0.166 0.030 0.097 0.024
   1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table 9. Out-of-sample predictions. Single females, 2000.  
     
 
1995 
(If observed in 2000)   
 
2000 
(If observed in 1995)   
All married females in 2000 
 
   Observed  Predicted  Observed Predicted  Observed Predicted 
Single  females    shares     probability  shares    probability  shares    probability 
                        
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Sector choice                        
Hospital   0.664  0.472 0.678 0.074 0.517 0.500 0.611 0.066 0.529 0.499 0.612 0.058
Primary care    0.220  0.414 0.214 0.063 0.390 0.488 0.248 0.050 0.394 0.489 0.236 0.047
Other     0.116  0.321 0.108 0.018  0.094 0.291 0.141 0.021 0.077 0.266 0.152 0.025
   1.000   1.000  1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 
                        
  
Share (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Share (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Share (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Pr (Job type) * 
Mean hours in job type
Hospital   22.1  16.4 22.0 3.3 16.3 16.4 19.6 3.1 16.9 16.5 20.0 2.7
Primary care    7.3  14.0 6.7 1.5 11.8 15.2 7.5 1.2 12.1 15.5 7.2 1.1
Other     3.2  9.2 3.3 0.6 2.8 9.0 4.2 0.6 2.2 7.9 4.6 0.8
All   32.6  6.1 32.1 2.3 30.8 6.4 31.3 2.0 31.2 6.3 31.9 1.8
                          
Categories of hours                          
Hours Cat.1 (Mean=18h/w)    0.050  0.217 0.050 0.065 0.073 0.260 0.065 0.056 0.067 0.249 0.051 0.048
Hours Cat.2 (Mean=21h/w)    0.053  0.224 0.063 0.051 0.082 0.274 0.080 0.043 0.071 0.257 0.068 0.039
Hours Cat.3 (Mean=25h/w)    0.070  0.255 0.083 0.028 0.094 0.292 0.094 0.023 0.085 0.279 0.086 0.023
Hours Cat.4 (Mean=28h/w)    0.095  0.293 0.092 0.014 0.120 0.325 0.096 0.012 0.120 0.325 0.091 0.014
Hours Cat.5 (Mean=30h/w)    0.079  0.270 0.094 0.009 0.112 0.316 0.092 0.008 0.114 0.317 0.090 0.009
Hours Cat.6 (Mean=33h/w)    0.123  0.329 0.089 0.012 0.147 0.354 0.079 0.008 0.152 0.359 0.079 0.007
Hours Cat.7 (Mean=35.5h/w)  0.230  0.421 0.313 0.111 0.174 0.379 0.337 0.121 0.189 0.391 0.370 0.115
Hours Cat.8 (Mean=37.5h/w)  0.167  0.373 0.120 0.025 0.098 0.297 0.091 0.016 0.108 0.310 0.095 0.014
Hours Cat.9 (Mean=40h/w)     0.133  0.340 0.097 0.024 0.100 0.301 0.066 0.014 0.094 0.292 0.070 0.013
   1.000    1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000  1.000 
                
Age     5,677       5,677     11,091   
Sample size    34.3  7.3    39.3 7.3    34.8 8.1  
             
* Significantly different from zero at a 10% level.  ** Significantly different from zero at a 5% level.   
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Table 10. Predictions of a policy experiment for single females 
             Predictions with     Predictions with      Predictions with      Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with   Predictions with  
Predicted  a 10% increase in  a 10% increase in    a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in  a 10% increase in    a 10% increase in   NOK 50,000 
         hospital wages    prim. care wages     both wages     non-health wages    all wages    non-wage income   in transfers 
                             
Mean  St.dev. MeanSt.dev. MeanSt.dev.    MeanSt.dev.    MeanSt.dev. MeanSt.dev.          MeanSt.dev. 
Prob (Sector choice)                                         
Hospital    0.680  0.071  0.706 0.078  0.648 0.066  0.676 0.073  0.667 0.068  0.664 0.071 0.679 0.072  0.640 0.077
Primary care    0.212  0.061  0.196 0.066  0.249 0.053  0.230 0.059  0.208 0.061  0.226 0.059 0.213 0.061  0.256 0.059
Non-health     0.108  0.018   0.099 0.018   0.103 0.016   0.094 0.017   0.125 0.022   0.109 0.019   0.108 0.018   0.104 0.020
   1.000    1.000   1.000  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000    1.000 
                                           
Pr (Sector) * Mean hours in sector                                       
Hospital    22.1  3.2  22.6 3.3  21.1 2.8  21.6 3  21.7 3  21.2 2.9 22.1 3.2  19.1 2.3
Primary care    6.7  1.5  6.1 1.6  7.8 1.4  7.2 1.5  6.6 1.5  7 1.5 6.7 1.5  7.5 1.6
Non-health     3.3  0.6   3 0.6   3.2 0.5   2.9 0.5   3.8 0.8   3.3 0.6   3.3 0.6   3 0.6
                                           
Sum over [Pr (Sector) *Mean hours in sector]                                   
Total    32.2  2.3  31.8 2.2  32 2.3  31.6 2.1  32.1 2.3  31.6 2.1 32.1 2.4  29.6 1.2
                                           
Wage elasticities    (New pred. hours-Old pred. hours)/Old pred. hours*10                             
All hours         -0.118** 0.057  -0.044** 0.021  -0.152** 0.066  -0.030* 0.016  -0.175** 0.076 -0.022 0.027 
Hospital hours         0.196** 0.075  -0.466** 0.208  -0.235* 0.135  -0.192** 0.094  -0.394* 0.207 -0.039 0.046 
Primary care hours         -0.883** 0.426  1.743** 0.854  0.724* 0.429  -0.192** 0.094  0.545 0.342 0.026 0.030 
Non-health hours              -0.883** 0.426   -0.466** 0.208   -1.263** 0.537   1.373** 0.647   -0.068 0.196   -0.033 0.050  
Standard deviation in italics. * Significantly different from zero at a 10% level.  ** Significantly different from zero at a 5% level.   25 
 
5. The costs of an active wage policy 
The total cost of a policy reform is of course strongly correlated to the change in 
hours worked in the different job types. As shown in the previous sections a job-
specific wage increase will have an impact on the choice of job types and hours 
worked, although to a modest degree. The analysis so far has focused on the average 
effect on hours of a change in wages. It is, however, not unlikely that the nurses are 
heterogeneous in their response to a wage reform, e.g. according to their position on 
the wage scale. Using individual specific hourly wages in combination with our 
predicted changes in job type and hours for each individual, we capture the total 
expected changes in wage costs. Focusing on wage increases in the public health 
sector defends disregarding the employers’ taxes, e.g. the proportional tax on labor 
costs. The additional tax paid by the public hospitals and nursing homes return as 
increased tax income in the state budget.  
 
A 10% simulated increase in hospital wages will increase the wage costs for the 
hospital jobs for the married females by 1.7 percent (Table A8 in Appendix 5). The 
average cost per hour is calculated to NOK 158.6 both prior to and after the simulated 
wage increase, due to a matching increase in hours. The new individuals attracted to 
the hospital sector must have a lower mean hourly salary than those already working 
there, cancelling out the 10% hourly wage increase. The average hourly wage in the 
primary care sector is predicted to be reduced by 9.1% to NOK 135.0, as those 
changing jobs from primary care to hospitals have a higher than average wage in the 
primary care sector. The primary care hours are predicted to be reduced by 2.2%, 
while the costs are reduced by 11.1%. Due to reductions in the two other job types, 
the total costs of all employed married nurses will be reduced by 2.7%.  
 
Looking at both hospitals and primary care jobs, a 10% wage increase will reduce the 
non-health hours and wage costs by 4.0%. Of the 166 RNs predicted to leave their 
non-health jobs, 45 find a hospital job and 141 a primary care job. However, the 
hospital hours and costs are unchanged, while the primary care hours and costs are 
increased by 1.5%. I interpret this as a reduction of hours for those already in the 
sector, reducing costs in spite of the hourly wage increase. Those entering the hospital 
and primary care jobs have a lower average wage canceling out added costs from the 
wage increases. The predicted changes in the costs for the single nurses mirror those 




The purpose of this study has been to identify the short-term effect of increases in 
hourly wages on hours worked in the health sector, both hoping to boost the hours 
worked by RNs already employed in the health sector and attract personnel from non-
health jobs. Wage is probably increasingly important to attract people to the nursing 
profession as is becomes less of a calling and more of a regular job. But this study 
indicates that once qualified, wage seems to have a modest impact on hours worked 
for the nurses, especially for married women. Wage also has a modest impact on the 
choice of job-type, but a simulated wage increase by 10% in health-jobs merely 
reduces the share of nurses preferring a non-health job from 16.8% to 16.1% for those 
married, and from 10.8% to 9.4% for the single females.  
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For married women I find job type specific wage elasticities of 0.17 for the hospital 
jobs. The increase in hours is partly due to the attraction of nurses from primary care 
and non-health jobs and partly due to an increase in the hours worked by those 
already working at the hospitals. The wage elasticity is predicted to be 0.39 for 
primary care jobs, and 0.43 for non-health jobs, but these elasticities are only 
significant at lower levels (80% and 90% respectively). For all hours worked by 
married female nurses, health and non-health, the income effect dominates the 
substitution effect with a wage elasticity of -0.026. This elasticity however is not 
significantly different from zero.  
 
For the single women the job specific wage elasticities are stronger, especially in the 
primary care sector. The wage elasticity for hospital hours is 0.20. The elasticity is 
much higher for primary care (1.7), but part of this effect is probably due to the fact 
that there are relatively few single nurses in the primary care sector compared to 
married ones, as nurses often start their career with a hospital job. For all hours 
worked by single female nurses, in health and non-health jobs, the wage elasticity is –
0.18. The elasticities for this group are more uncertain, with higher standard 
deviations. But they are all significantly different from zero.  
 
The conclusion is that wage has the effect of increasing hours worked in the health 
sector. But there is a loss incurred as the average nurse’s working hours are predicted 
to be slightly reduced by such a policy. As expected, single nurses are more 
responsive to wage than those who are married. The complexity of the nurses’ choices 
and the many other characteristics that are important with regard to the choice of job 
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Appendix 1. Variable construction and trimming procedure. 
The data used is based on several of the administrative data registers delivered by 
Statistics Norway, with the register of authorized health personnel as an identifier. 
Our trimming procedure excludes personnel above 66 years of age, as many retire at 
67. Some personnel categories have access to early retirement, but it was not common 
practice for registered nurses in 1995.  
 
Authorized foreign RNs are excluded when they do not have a permanent residency in 
Norway (only temporarily residency code/social security number, F-number), or if 
they have a permanent residency code, but no income or address in Norway. The data 
includes information about annual earnings prior to and after taxation, employment 
status, and demographic variables. All employers are coded by the NACE Standard 
Industrial Classification, which gives us detailed information on their sector and type 
of activity.  
 
Table A1 Sample trimming 
 N 
  
RNs registered in 1995 (permanent residence code only)  63,527
  
Subtracting   
Foreigners with no income in Norway  3,934
RNs with higher education (Not nursing related)  658
67 years or older  2,387
Registered during 1995  2,722
Temporary licenses  40




Table A2 Key variables by sector 
Variable Hospital    
Primary 
care   
Private 
health 
care    Non-health    Non-work   Transfers 
1995 Mean St.d.   Mean St.d.  Mean St.d.  Mean St.d.   Mean St.d. Mean St.d.
                         
Sector share  49.9%   25.7%  5.1%  15.3%   0.9%  6.1% 
N 24,144   13,208  2,617  7,876   479  3,127 
                          
Age 40.0 9.8  42.0 10.1 43.9 9.2 43.1 9.4  50.4 11.3 50.8 11.8
Female=1 92.4%   93.2%  90.9%  86.8%   97.7%  97.2% 
Single=1 23.9%   14.3%  10.4%  14.6%   9.4%  12.0% 
Married=1 64.6%   73.2%  78.6%  69.7%   85.2%  68.0% 
Divorced=1 7.8%   8.2%  7.3%  10.4%   2.5%  10.5% 
Born in  
Norway=1  91.5%   92.2%  91.9%  92.5%   85.6%  91.1% 
Gave birth in  
1994 or  
1995 =1  13.4%   12.7%  8.5%  9.4%   3.3%  1.7% 
# of children  
if parent  2.2 0.9  2.4 1.0 2.4 0.9 2.4 1.0  2.5 1.2 2.6 1.1
                          
Years since  
authorization 14.3 10.4  16.2 11.0 18.7 10.1 17.5 10.3  24.4 12.0 24.9 11.9
Number of years  
worked last  
20 years  13.7 5.3  13.9 5.2 14.9 4.7 14.9 4.8  9.7 5.8 13.0 5.5
Income from  
work 199  810 54 731  193 071 54 028 201 416 87 267 205 423122 333  12 768 14 566 5 402 9 599
Total  
Income 219  410 57 530  215 255 57 450 223 549 93 865 238 877147 162  26 326 54 621 122 10469 940
Transfers 16  482 22 057  19 245 22 790 16 491 21 743 6 207 13 763  6 207 13 763 109 68960 705
            
Wage per hour  136 7  128 4 114 7 163 10        
Hours per year   1 470 390  1 510 410 1 770 750 1 260 720        
                  
Hours Cat.1  20.7%    21.6%  22.2%  33.4%         
Hours Cat.2  29.1%    33.0%  26.1%  29.5%          
Hours Cat.3  50.1%    45.4%  51.7%  37.2%          
                          
Spouse's  
total income  315 907319 714  288 086204 982 395 412589 663 324 689293 860  371 194420 800 355 575
417 
588
Spouse's income  




does not work =1  8.8%      12.8%     10.3%     12.6%      29.2%    27.8%   
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Table A3 Samples used in the analysis, 1995 
Variable    
Married 
females     
 
Single  
females    
All nurses 
with data    
             
N   25,242  7,782  45,228 
            
Age   43.1 9.2 35.0 8.9 41.17 9.89
Female=1   1  1  0.92 
Single=1   0  1  0.19 
Married=1   1  0  0.68 
Divorced=1   0  0  0.08 
Born in Norway=1    0.93  0.91  0.92 
Gave birth in 1994 or 1995    0.12 0.15  0.13 
Number of children in 1995    2.5 0.9 1.3 0.6 2.1 1.0
# of children if mother    2.5 0.9 1.5 0.7 2.3 1.0
Years since authorization    17.7 10.2 9.3 9.0 15.4 10.6
Number of years worked last 20 years   14.8 4.6 11.2 5.6 13.9 5.2
           
Income from work    185 79772 916 206 58252 403 198 810 71 208
Total income    208 38371 269 222 90749 959 221 576 81 017
Transfers    19 65820 193 13 66524 579 19 136 26 646
Non-work    229 53786 597 43 56780 790 169 530200 345
           
Wage per hour, ca    138 13 135 13 138 14
Hours per year, ca     1,353 485 1,541 379 1,445 477
           
Hours Cat.1 Half time and less    0.30 0.14  0.23 
Hours Cat.2 Part-time    0.35 0.25  0.30 
Hours Cat.3 Full-time    0.35 0.61  0.46 
             
Hospital    0.50  0.66  0.53 
Primary care    0.33  0.22  0.29 
Non-health    0.17  0.12  0.17 
             
Centrality Index 1 (Least Central)    0.08 0.08  0.07 
Centrality Index 2    0.04 0.05  0.04 
Centrality Index 3    0.09 0.09  0.09 
Centrality Index 4    0.02 0.01  0.02 
Centrality Index 5    0.04 0.03  0.03 
Centrality Index 6    0.20 0.14  0.19 
Centrality Index 7    0.52 0.61  0.55 
             
Work Region A Oslo/Akershus    0.19  0.30  0.22 
Work Region East excl.Oslo/Ak.    0.25  0.17  0.24 
Work Region South Agder/Rogaland  0.16  0.09  0.14 
Work Region West    0.18  0.15  0.16 
Work Region North     0.18     0.24    0.19  
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Appendix 2. Wages 
Annual income by sector 
I have constructed sector-specific hourly wages for all nurses, including sectors where 
they not are participating. The first step in this process is to sort the jobs by the NACE 
standard industrial classification and aggregate into sectors or practice types. As 
described in table A3 I have chosen to use seven ‘sectors’ when I construct hourly 
wages: a) hospitals, b) public primary care, c) private health practice and d) other non-
health work. Those who earned less than the minimum amount to qualify for pension 
entitlements (1G=NOK 39,340), are categorized as e) not working. Self-employment 
is allocated to the non-health sector.  
Hourly wages 
The earnings measure used is hourly wage. I calculated hourly wages for the 
subsample with a full-time job for the whole year by dividing the annual income by 
the normal working hours for the job type concerned. Intuitively there is reason to 
believe that there is a selection into the different job types, driven by unobserved 
factors like preferences and productivity. When I predict hourly wages for each 
individual, also in the job categories where they do not work, I take this selection into 
consideration. I apply a Heckman two-step procedure when estimating the wage 
equations as presented in Table A4, and find a significant selection effect. I repeat this 
procedure for each job category. Table A4 only reports the wage equation for the 
hospital sector. I exclude the equations for the other sectors, as they are parallel. The 
hours ‘observed’ are calculated by dividing the annual income by the hourly wage for 
the job category chosen by the individual.  
Experience 
In many empirical studies a labor market experience is proxied by potential 
experience, i.e. age-education-7. This is a problematic upper bound for experience 
which is more upwardly biased for women, who tend to be more loosely connected to 
the labor market, at least in connection with maternity leave. This is highly relevant 
for the nurse profession. I have therefore used the number of years with an income 
qualifying for pension entitlement during the last 20 years as a measure of experience. 
The measure is constructed on earnings histories available from the Norwegian 
National Insurance Scheme, which was established in 1967. Individual ‘pension 
entitlements’ in this scheme are linked to their income histories. I have also tested the 
traditional experience measure but found the measure based on ‘pension entitlements’ 
to be more suitable.  32 
Table A4 Wage equation from a Heckman selection model 
   Coef. Std. Err z
   Dependent variable: Wage per hour in the hospital sector          
Female Female=1  -0.033 0.006 -5.84
Regiona Oslo/Akershus  0.043 0.010 4.53
Regionc West  -0.015 0.005 -3.11
Regiond Middle  -0.006 0.006 -1.03
Regione North  -0.013 0.005 -2.35
Age Age  0.122 0.047 2.62
age2 Age^2/10  -0.353 0.164 -2.16
age3 Age^3/1000  0.435 0.249 1.75
age4 Age^4/100000  -0.194 0.139 -1.39
erf95  Years of work experience last 20 years  -0.018 0.011 -1.61
erf952 Experience^2/10  0.408 0.176 2.32
erf953 Experience^3/1000  -2.519 1.118 -2.25
erf954 Experience^4/100000  5.081 2.434 2.09
Cnordic  From Nordic country except Norway=1  0.039 0.008 4.82
coecd_no  From OECD area except the Nordic countries=1  0.006 0.010 0.56
Cglobal Non-OECD  background=1  0.019 0.012 1.61
kommsen1  Centrality index 1 =1   0.019 0.007 2.58
kommsen2  Centrality index 2 =1   0.013 0.006 2.11
kommsen3  Centrality index 3 =1   0.013 0.005 2.65
kommsen4  Centrality index 4 =1   0.061 0.019 3.19
kommsen5  Centrality index 5 =1   0.021 0.009 2.39
kommsen6  Centrality index 6 =1   -0.012 0.005 -2.4
Constant     3.442 0.475 7.24
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Table A4 continued- Selection into the hospital sector 
      
Select             
Female Female=1  -0.657 0.033 -19.96
Regiona Oslo/Akershus  -0.889 0.037 -24.02
Regionc West  0.062 0.032 1.9
Regiond Middle  -0.057 0.036 -1.58
Regione North  0.219 0.034 6.42
Cnordic  From Nordic country except Norway=1  0.014 0.050 0.29
coecd_no  From OECD area except the Nordic countries=1  -0.008 0.065 -0.13
Cglobal Non-OECD  background=1  0.188 0.077 2.42
Age Age  -0.684 0.288 -2.38
age2 Age^2/10  1.817 1.022 1.78
age3 Age^3/1000  -1.948 1.569 -1.24
age4 Age^4/100000  0.652 0.882 0.74
erf95  Years of work experience last 20 years  0.094 0.064 1.47
erf952 Experience^2/10  0.117 1.048 0.11
erf953 Experience^3/1000  -6.147 6.783 -0.91
erf954 Experience^4/100000  23.834 14.933 1.6
Married Married=1  -0.494 0.020 -24.2
b950_5  No. of children Aged 0-5  -0.293 0.018 -16.35
kommsen1  Centrality index 1 =1   0.059 0.051 1.17
kommsen2  Centrality index 2 =1   0.161 0.044 3.62
kommsen3  Centrality index 3 =1   0.096 0.033 2.87
kommsen4  Centrality index 4 =1   -0.234 0.115 -2.04
kommsen5  Centrality index 5 =1   -0.021 0.057 -0.36
kommsen6  Centrality index 6 =1   0.045 0.031 1.45
Constant     8.723 2.922 2.99
      
/athrho    -0.574 0.093 -6.18
/lnsigma    -2.113 0.030 -69.86
Rho    -0.518 0.068 
Sigma    0.121 0.004 
Lambda     -0.063 0.010  
 
Number of obs  24,171   Log likelihood  -6,934.4
Censored obs   17,827  Wald chi2(22)      =  996.11








Table A5 Tax rules applied  
Income = Y  Tax 
0 – 20 954  0 
20 954 – 143 500  0.302Y – 6 328 
143 500 – 212 000  0.358Y – 14 364 
212 000 – 239 000  0.453Y – 34 504 
239 000 -  0.495Y – 44 542 
 
Capital tax 
Capital income is taxed at 28 percent.34 
Appendix 4. Predicted choices of the discrete choice model without the health care provider indicator in the opportunity index.  
 
Table A6. Extended model - Married females. Predicted changes in sector choices and working hours in policy simulations. (Without  3 ν ).  
                   
          Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with   Predictions with     Predictions with  
    Predicted      a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in   a 10% increase in     NOK 50,000 
               hospital wages     prim. care wages     both wages     non-health wages  all wages     in transfers 
                                   
   Mean  St.dev.  Mean  St.dev.    Mean  St.dev.    Mean  St.dev.   Mean  St.dev.  Mean St.dev.    Mean  St.dev. 
Prob (Sector choice)                                 
Hospital   0.378  0.020   0.381  0.021   0.376  0.019    0.379  0.020   0.376  0.019  0.377  0.019   0.376  0.017 
Primary care    0.304  0.014   0.303  0.015   0.308  0.011    0.307  0.012   0.303  0.015  0.305  0.013   0.308  0.010 
Non-health     0.317  0.010     0.316  0.009     0.316  0.009     0.314  0.009     0.321  0.012  0.317  0.010     0.316  0.009 
        1.000      1.000     1.000     1.000    1.000     1.000   
                                  
Pr (Sector) * Mean hours in sector                                
Hospital hours    10.9  0.7   10.9  0.7   10.8  0.6    10.9  0.7   10.8  0.6  10.8  0.6   10.7  0.5 
Primary care hours    8.3  0.5   8.2  0.5   8.4  0.5    8.3  0.5   8.2  0.5  8.3  0.5   8.3  0.5 
Non-health hours    8.6  0.5   8.6  0.5   8.6  0.5    8.5  0.5   8.7  0.6  8.6  0.5   8.5  0.5 
                                    
Sum over [Pr (Sector) *Mean hours in sector]                                
Total   27.8  0.7   27.8  0.6   27.8  0.6    27.7  0.6   27.8  0.6  27.7  0.6   27.6  0.5 
                                     
Wage elasticities    (New pred. hours-Old pred. hours)/Old pred. hours*10                      
All hours         -0.006  0.008   -0.004  0.007    -0.010  0.014   -0.005  0.009  -0.014  0.022   -0.064  0.083 
Hospital hours          0.062  0.053   -0.056  0.058    0.006  0.014   -0.050  0.056  -0.042  0.061   -0.144  0.180 
Primary care hours          -0.050  0.053   0.124  0.164    0.073  0.109   -0.050  0.056  0.024  0.055   0.083  0.161 
Non-health hours              -0.050  0.053     -0.056  0.058     -0.105  0.107     0.095  0.095  -0.011  0.022     -0.089  0.112 
Standard deviation in italics. * Significantly different from zero at a 10% level.  ** Significantly different from zero at a 5% level.   
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Table A7. Single nurses. Predicted changes in sector choices and working hours in policy simulations. (Without  3 ν ). 
                                                                 
    Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with  
Predicted  a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in    a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     NOK 50,000 
          hospital wages     prim. care wages     both wages     non-health wages     all wages     in transfers 
                               
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Prob (Job type choice)                                      
Hospital   0.579 0.114  0.603 0.119 0.565 0.114 0.590 0.118  0.567 0.114  0.578 0.117 0.582 0.124
Primary care    0.182 0.056  0.172 0.059 0.202 0.057  0.191 0.059  0.177 0.055  0.187 0.057 0.198 0.061
Non-health     0.239 0.062   0.225 0.063   0.233 0.059   0.219 0.060   0.256 0.066   0.235 0.063 0.220 0.064
   1.000  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000 
                                    
Pr (Job type) * Mean hours in job type                                 
Hospital   19.1 3.8  19.5 3.9 18.6 3.7 19.1 3.8  18.6 3.7  18.7 3.8 17.9 3.7
Primary care    6.0 1.7  5.6 1.8 6.6 1.8 6.2 1.8  5.8 1.7  6.1 1.8 6.1 1.9
Non-health   7.7 2.0  7.2 2.0 7.5 1.9 7.0 1.9  8.1 2.2  7.4 2.0 6.7 2.0
                                    
Sum over [Pr (Job type) *Mean hours in job type]                                
Total   32.7 1.6  32.4 1.4 32.6 1.5 32.3 1.4  32.6 1.5  32.2 1.3 30.8 0.6
                                     
Wage elasticities    (New pred. hours-Old pred. hours)/Old pred. hours*10                       
All        -0.094* 0.053 -0.027* 0.015  -0.116** 0.059  -0.040 0.025  -0.149** 0.073    
Hospital         0.258* 0.142 -0.248* 0.140  0.020 0.037  -0.223 0.137  -0.182 0.129    
Primary care          -0.629* 0.372 1.034* 0.558  0.339 0.236  -0.223 0.137  0.129 0.108    
Non-health              -0.629* 0.372   -0.248* 0.140   -0.843* 0.437   0.551* 0.304   -0.330* 0.190        
Standard deviation in italics. * Significantly different from zero at a 10% level.  ** Significantly different from zero at a 5% level.   
 36 
Appendix 5. The predicted costs of a simulated wage increase.  
 
Table A8. Extended model - Married females with basic model (A). Predicted cost changes in policy simulations.  
    Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with  
N=25242 Predicted  a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     NOK 50,000 
           hospital wages     prim. care wages     both wages     non-health wages     all wages     in transfers 
                              
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
                   
Predicted total net wage cost per sector. In million NOK per year: 48 weeks, 7,782 individuals                
Hospital   2  831 313 2  879 323 2  529 268 2  830 305 2  550 273 2  805 295 2  484 240
Primary care  1 511 190 1  343 176 1  568 187 1  533 189 1  361 172 1  520 187 1  400 167
Non-health   940 116 919  113 924 111 903 109 1  080 141 1  037 128 924 111
All sectors    5 282 259 5  140 253 5  021 243 5  266 250 4  991 254 5  362 258 4  807 209
                                      
Difference in net wage costs in million NOK between predictions before and after the wage increase.                
Hospital         47     -302    -1   -281   -26   -348 
Primary care        -168     57    22   -150   9    -111 
Non-health         -22     -16   -37   139   96   -17 
All sectors          -142     -261    -16   -292   79   -475 
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Table A9.  Single nurses with basic model (A). Predicted cost changes in policy simulations.  
                                    
    Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with     Predictions with  
N=7782 Predicted  a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     a 10% increase in     NOK 50,000 
           hospital wages    prim. care wages     both wages     non-health wages    all wages     in transfers 
                                
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
                                    
Predicted total net wage cost per sector. In million NOK per year: 48 weeks, 7,782 individuals                     
Hospital   1  279 189 1  304 196 1  107 156 1  248 180 1  139 164 1  227 173 1  005 134
Primary care    331 74 304 82 424 76 390 83 325 74 383 82 371 80
Non-health   207 38 188 35 197 34 180 32 259 52 226 42 185 35
All sectors    1 817 149 1  797 140 1  727 128 1  817 132 1  724 137 1  836 133 1  561 86
                                    
Difference in net wage costs in million NOK between predictions before and after wage increase.                  
Hospital         26   -172    -31   -139   -52   -273 
Primary care          -27   92    58   -6   52   40 
Non-health         -18   -10   -27   53   19   -22 
All  sectors          -20   -90   1   -93   19   -256 
                                                                 
 
 
 
 